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Why do Chinese local governments transfer their rights of control 
over SOEs to the central government? 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates local authorities’ motives for transferring their rights of 
control over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the central government. Using a 
difference-in-difference approach, we find that both employment and investment 
improves significantly following such transfers, and these findings are more 
pronounced among firms located in regions where the political pressure on local 
officials is higher. However, we fail to find any significant improvement in 
profitability. Our findings suggest that local governments tend to alleviate the political 
pressure they face by giving up their control rights and even sacrifice long-term 
economic benefits to do so. 
 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises; Control rights; China 
JEL classification: H11; H7; J63  
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1 Introduction 
Since 1980, many countries, and not only the ex-communist economies but also 
developed economies such as the UK, have substantially reformed their state-owned 
enterprises (hereafter SOEs) (D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 
2001). As the largest transitional economy in the world, China launched its SOE 
reforms in 1979. Contrary to the big-bang approach to privatization adopted by the 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries, the Chinese government 
explicitly pursued a strategy of “grasping the big and letting go of the small”. That is, 
they retained state control of large enterprises and retreated from small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Sun and Tong, 2003). As a result, hundreds of thousands of 
local SOEs have been privatized during the last three decades, with local governments 
the major players behind the rise in privatization1 (Cao et al., 1999; Garnaut et al., 
2005; Liu et al., 2007).  
The effect of China’s privatization program has been controversial, and has come 
in for much criticism over the years. Despite some evidence supporting its positive 
role in improving the profitability of local SOEs (Jefferson and Su, 2006; Fisman and 
Wang, 2014), the privatization has been challenged for increasing the unemployment 
rate (Garnaut et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2005)2, encouraging corruption, and causing a 
loss of state-owned assets (Fisman and Wang, 2014). After taking office in 2002, 
China’s former president Hu Jintao stressed the importance of stability and social 
harmony, which were linked closely to an official’s political achievements and hence 
promotion. In response to Hu’s governing concept, local governments began to focus 
increasingly on social performance, through aspects such as employment 
opportunities (Huang et al., 2014). As a result, privatization was gradually slowed 
down, and replaced with a new form of SOE reform, in which local governments 
transferred their control rights over local SOEs to the central government at a low 
price or even for free. Following this, the local SOEs would eventually become 
centrally controlled. In return, the centralized SOEs made a commitment to improve 
                                                             
1 The privatization reached its peak during the period of 1998-2002 (Fisman and Wang, 2014). 
2 Between 1995 and 2003, more than 43 million employees of SOEs were made redundant (Xu et al., 2005). 
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their level of investment and employ greater numbers in return for their greater access 
to financial resources and stronger fiscal position. 
This paper attempts to examine the effects of local governments transferring 
their control rights over SOEs to the central government. Using a unique dataset and 
difference-in-difference (DID) approach, we find a significant improvement in both 
employment and investment after these transfers, and show the improvement to be 
more pronounced among firms located in regions where local officials face greater 
political pressure. In contrast, we find no evidence of improved profitability for the 
SOEs. Overall, our findings suggest that local governments are likely to chase 
political objectives at the expense of long-term economic benefits. 
 
2 Sample and Model 
The treated group includes 65 listed local SOEs whose control rights were transferred 
to the central government during 2004-2011. To reduce estimation bias due to 
confounding effects, each treated firm was matched to a non-transferred listed local 
SOE in the same industry and with the closest size, measured one year prior to the 
transfer.3 Additionally, using the transfer year of the treated firm as a benchmark, we 
ensured that every treated and matched firm had data available for four years, two 
years before and two years after the transfer. These criteria yielded a final sample of 
1,015 firm-year observations.  
To analyze the effects of the transfer of control rights we employ a DID approach 
as follows: 
Performance=α0+α1Treat+α2Post+α3Treat*Post+Controls+ε         (1)  
where Performance represents an array of dependent variables, including Employment 
defined as the percentage of workers who would be laid off if the firm were operating 
at the industry-average level of sales per capita (Bai et al., 2005), Investment 
measured as investment expenditure divided by total assets, ROA measured as net 
income divided by total assets, ROE measured as net income scaled by shareholders’ 
                                                             
3 The unreported results show that, after the matching, the main variables were indifferent between the treated and 
non-treated groups. We did not use the propensity scoring matching (PSM) approach due to the small sample size 
of the treated firms. 
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equity, and Turnover defined as sales scaled by total assets. Treat is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is in the treatment group and zero otherwise. Post is also a 
dummy variable that equals one for the post-transfer period, and zero otherwise. In 
addition, we control for other factors that may affect the performance variables, 
including Size (logarithm of total assets), Lev (total liabilities/total assets), and Growth 
(growth rate of total assets). 
In a further piece of analysis we examine the impact of political pressure on the 
effect of the transfer of control rights. Since the early 1980s, China has gradually 
shifted its focus for personnel evaluation criteria away from political loyalty towards 
economic and social performance (Chen et al., 2005). Given the centralized control of 
personnel, local government officials come under pressure regarding both social 
stability and economic growth. In other words, local officials may suffer from greater 
pressure if the employment rate and economic growth in their jurisdiction fall behind 
those of their counterparts. Thus, we use two measures to proxy for political pressure. 
One is the regional unemployment rate. Local officials face greater pressure if this is 
above the national median. The other proxy is relative GDP growth. Local officials 
face greater pressure if this statistic is lower than that of neighbouring regions (Cai et 
al., 2014).  
The variables used in our study, other than those concerning political pressure, 
come from the China Securities Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
The data used to proxy for political pressure, including the regional employment rate 
and GDP growth, were manually collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. To 
reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers, all continuous variables were 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the 
variables. 
 
3 Regression Results 
Table 2 presents regression results on the effect of the transfer of control rights on 
employment and investment. As seen from Columns 1 and 4, the treated firms 
experienced a significantly higher increase in employment rate and investment 
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expenditure than their non-treated peers. This supports the view that a transfer of 
control rights to the central government does facilitate job creation and investment 
expansion, which are the top priorities of local government officials. Further analysis 
suggests that the effects of transferring control rights are not uniform across firms but 
are conditional on the level of political pressure in their region. For instance, as 
indicated by Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient on the interaction term Treat*Post is 
significant only when the regional unemployment rate is high. The difference in the 
coefficient between the two subsamples is significant at the 5% level. When it comes 
to growth-related pressure, we obtain similar findings, as reported in Columns 5 and 6. 
The coefficient on Treat*Post is significantly positive when the regional growth 
pressure is high, and insignificant otherwise. In addition, the difference in the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. These findings support the notion that local 
officials tend to relieve their political pressure at the cost of the control rights of local 
SOEs. This is especially the case when the pressure facing the local officials is 
higher.4 
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that the measures directly related to 
political achievements, namely employment and investment, improved significantly 
following the transfer of control rights. An equally important question then arises, as 
to how the transfer of control rights affects the firms’ profitability. As seen from Table 
3, where profitability is measured as ROA, ROE and Turnover, transferring the 
control rights of local SOEs to the central government fails to bring any economic 
benefits. For instance, the coefficients on Treat*Post are consistently insignificant 
across the three columns. Taken together, the overall findings suggest that, through 
the transfer of local SOEs’ control rights, local governments achieve their political 
objectives to some extent, but sacrifice long-term economic benefits in the meantime. 
 
                                                             
4 As suggested by the anonymous referee, the motivation for transfer of ownership might be greater among 
export-led SOEs than others due to higher needs for protecting employment. In an attempt to address the point, we 
carry out a subsample analysis for comparing export-led and non-export-led SOEs. Export-led industries are 
identified according to the China Customs Statistics. The untabulated results suggest that our main findings, i.e. the 
increase in employment and investment, are primarily driven by the export-led SOEs operating in regions with 
higher political pressure. The results are available upon request.        
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4 Conclusions 
This paper examines local governments’ motives for transferring their control rights 
over local SOEs to the central government. Our findings suggest that employment and 
investment improve significantly following such transfers. However, they do not yield 
any significant economic benefits in the long term. Our results extend the literature on 
the political side of economics and finance by showing how the incentives of 
politicians can affect firms’ economic activities and performance. Also, our findings 
contribute to the current debate over which path the SOE reforms should take: 
privatization or centralization.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Min Max Std 
Investment 0.076 0.056 -0.083 0.445 0.081 
Employment -0.004 0.176 -1.978 0.744 0.690 
ROA 0.019 0.023 -0.237 0.181 0.063 
ROE 0.020 0.200 -1.080 0.050 0.340 
Turnover 0.730 0.490 0.080 0.600 2.580 
Size 21.619 21.612 18.756 24.486 0.941 
Lev 0.535 0.544 0.113 1.291 0.204 
Growth 0.134 0.081 -0.346 1.485 0.266 
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Table 2 The Effect of Control Rights Transfer on Employment and Investment 
 Dependent=Employment Dependent=Investment 
 Full 
sample 
High 
unemployment 
Low 
unemployment 
Full 
sample 
Low 
growth 
High 
growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treat*Post 0.134** 0.315*** -0.041 0.015* 0.020** 0.013 
 
P-value for the equality test 
(2.020) (2.928) (-0.325) 
[0.029] ** 
(1.722) 
 
(2.374) 
 
(1.093) 
[0.001] *** 
       
Post 0.051 -0.059 0.141* -0.025** -0.022** -0.029** 
 (1.157) (-0.677) (1.704) (-2.418) (-2.272) (-2.126) 
Treat -0.010 -0.084 0.072 -0.018** -0.005 -0.029** 
 (-0.100) (-0.743) (0.509) (-2.152) (-0.481) (-2.528) 
Size -0.239*** -0.168* -0.313*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 (-3.731) (-1.805) (-5.806) (3.524) (3.067) (2.521) 
Lev -0.032 -0.309 0.362 -0.041** -0.031* -0.046** 
 (-0.128) (-1.028) (1.261) (-2.264) (-1.733) (-2.201) 
Growth -0.317** -0.382** -0.264 0.068*** 0.052 0.076*** 
 (-2.216) (-2.024) (-1.592) (3.176) (1.593) (4.802) 
ROA -0.879 -1.702** 0.197 0.046 0.112* 0.021 
 (-1.636) (-2.161) (0.349) (1.144) (1.881) (0.403) 
Intercept 5.179*** 3.838** 6.519*** -0.197** -0.274** -0.168 
 (4.013) (2.046) (5.814) (-2.244) (-2.349) (-1.497) 
Obs. 1011 501 510 1015 458 557 
Adj.R2 0.160 0.140 0.210 0.124 0.114 0.139 
11 
 
Table 3 The Effect of Control Rights Transfer on Profitability 
 ROA ROE Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treat*Post 0.006 -0.012 0.037 
 (1.042) (-0.652) (0.894) 
Post -0.003 -0.007 0.084*** 
 (-0.417) (-0.498) (2.594) 
Treat -0.012** -0.008 0.013 
 (-2.240) (-0.450) (0.179) 
Size 0.009*** 0.031*** -0.003 
 (3.504) (3.321) (-0.082) 
Lev -0.131*** -0.370*** 0.028 
 (-8.808) (-5.868) (0.136) 
Growth 0.068*** 0.209*** -0.135 
 (5.387) (4.674) (-1.526) 
Intercept -0.106** -0.465** 0.740 
 (-2.010) (-2.554) (0.822) 
Obs. 1015 995 1013 
Adj.R2 0.296 0.198 0.012 
 
